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CASES NOTED
TAXATION-JURY CHARGE-TAX BENEFIT RULE
Defendant in a personal injury suit requested the trial court to charge
that any award made to the plaintiff would not be subject to federal income
taxes.' Held, the court's refusal to give this charge was not error since
federal income taxes were not a proper subject for the jury's consideration.
Maus v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis Rd. Co., 165 Ohio St. 281, 135
N.E.2d 253 (1956).
Proper charges concerning federal income taxation present a modern
2
twofold problem. :' The weight of authority sustains the proposition that,
due to the myriad uncertainties involved, no deduction ought to be made
for future income tax liability when computing damages for the plaintiff's
loss of future earning capacity. 4 In addition, the majority of courts hold
that juries should not be instructed that the damage award itself is not
taxable income to the plaintiff.-- This latter inhibition is premised on the
contention that no matters relating to federal income taxation can be
presented to-the jury.0 A prescient Missouri court, in Dempsey v. Thomp-
1. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 104 (a), which provides: ". . . gross income
does not include . . the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or
agreement) on account of personal injury ....-
2. Compare the number of individual income tax returns filed in 1938,
6,150,776; U. S. BlUnLu OF CENsus, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF UNITEn STATES, 254 (1943) with the number filed in 1952, 56,317,000; Id. 371
(1952). See 8 ARK. L. Rev. 174 (1954).
3. Combs v. Chicago St. P., NI. & 0. Ry., 135 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Iowa 1955);
Mitchell v. Emblade, 80 Ariz. 398, 298 P.2d 1034 (1956); Allendorf v. Elgin, Joliet
and Eastern Ry., 8 Ill. 2d 164, 133 N.E.2d 288 (1956); Wagner v. Illinois Cent. R.R.,
7 Ill. App. 2d 445, 129 N.E.2d 771 (1955); Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill.
2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955), reversing 349 Ill. App. 175, 110 N.E.2d 654 (1953);
Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952); Phister v. Cleveland,
96 Ohio App. 185, 113 N.E.2d 336 (1953); John F. Buckner & Sons v. Allen, 289
S.W.2d 394 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
4. Chicago & N.WV. Rv, Co. v. Curl, 178 F.2d 497 (8th Cir. 1949); Stokes
v. U.S., 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944); Combs v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 135
F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Iowa 1955); Runnels v. Douglas, 124 F. Supp. 657 (D.C. Alaska
1954); O'Donnell v. Great N.R., 109 F. Supp. 590 (N.). Cal. 1951); Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. v. Brown, 93 Ca. App. 805, 92 S.E.2d 874, 875 (1956) (dictum); Wawrysyzmn
v. Illinois Cent. R,.R., 10 Ill. App. 2d 394, 135 N.E.2d 154 (1956); Smith v. Penn.
R.R., 88 Ohio App. 243, 99 N.E.2d 501 (1950); Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R. v. McFerrin,
279 S.W. 2d 410 (Texas 1955); Billiugham v. Hughes [19491 1 K.B. 643, 9 A.L.R.2d
311. Cf. Cole v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 59 F. Supp. 443 (D.C. Minn. 1945).
5. Combs v. Chicago St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 135 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Iowa 1955);
Vagner v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 7 Ill. App. 2d 445, 129 N.E.2d 771 (1955); Hall v.
Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955); John F. Buckner & Sons
v. Allen, 289 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R. v. MeFerrin,
279 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955), reVed on other grounds 291 S.W.2d 931
(Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
6. Combs v. Chicago St. P., M. & 0. Ry., supra note 5; Wagner v. Illinois
Cent. R., supra note 5; Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., supra note 5; John F. Buckner
& Sons v. Allen, supra note 5. These courts manifestly are of the opinion that the
CASENOTES
son,7 recognizing the "tax consciousness" of the jury, reached a conclusion
partially contrary to established authority." It agreed that the determination
of plaintiff's damage for loss of future earnings should be based upon his
gross income. However, the court ruled that the defendant was entitled
to have the jury instructed that any amount that was awarded to the
plaintiff would not be subject to federal income taxes," It was decided
that the plaintiff had no right to receive an enhanced award due to a
probable misconception on the part of a tax conscious Jury that the
judgment would be considerably reduced by federal income taxation. 10
The instant case adopts in its entirety the reasoning of the majority.
However, the jury must take into account the fact that plaintiff's award,
for loss of future earnings, must be reduced to its value as a lump sum
payable at present." Dictum of the concurring Justice, in effect, agrees
with the "tax conscious" rule in the Dempsey case.'
2
By refusing to inform the jury of the "tax benefit" rule, 13 the defendant
may be inordinately prejudiced; and the plaintiff, ipso facto, may receive
more than that to which he is entitled. The avowed purpose of com-
pensatory damages is to make the plaintiff whole. 14 The court's refusal
to give the requested "tax benefit" charge will result in a compound
violation of this postulate. To the extent that an additional benefit is
confererd upon the plaintiff this refusal does not, per se, tender the
ruling of the majority erroneous. However, when by the application of
the "no charge" rule a penalty may be haphazardly imposed upon the
defendant, in addition to the plaintiff's being more than wholly com-
pensated, the position of the majority becomes untenable. A penalty is
haphazardly imposed upon the defendant whenever he is unable to take
as a tax deductible item the amount of the plaintiff's recovery, because
the plaintiff's claim was not incident to the defendant's business, but
two matters tinder discussion are inextricably wound together; therefore any attempt
to separate them, i.e., give the requested "tax benefit" charge, would be prejudicial
to the plaintiff.
7. 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952), overruling, Ililton v. Thompson, 360
Mo. 177, 227 S.V.2d 675 (1950)(in which defendant requested "the jury to exclude
any amount for taxes because the plaintiff would not have to pay any.") But see
Margevich v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 1 II. App. 2d 162, 116 N.E.2d 914 (1953).
8. See notes 3 and 4 sura.
9. Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 347, 251 S.W.2d 42,45 (1952). (This
ruling was held, for extraneous reasons, to be prospective only.) See Southern Pac. v.
Guthrie, 186 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1951); Texas & N.O.Ry. v. Pool, 263 S.W.2d 582
(Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
10. Id. at 346, 251 S.W.2d at 45.
11. Maus v. New York, Chi. & St. L. R.R., 165 Ohio St. 281, 285, 135 N.E.2d
253, 256 (1956).
12. Id. at 286, 135 N.E.2d at 256.
13. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 104 (a).
14. Sidelinker v. York Shore Water Co., 117 Me. 578, 105 Ati. 122 (1918). See
Oleck, Damages to Persons and Property §§ 80-84 (1955).
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arose out of a purely personal venture. 1 The decisions in virtually all of
the cases' dealing with the two issues under discussion were based upon
the doctrine of Billingham v. Hughes."T The reasoning of the English
Justices in that case, i.e., the uncertainties involved require the elimination
of all tax issues, is therefore the foundation upon which the American
cases stand. That foundation has been completely destroyed by a recent
House of Lords decision, British Transport Commission v. Gourley,8 which
specifically overruled the Billingham case, Lord Jowett stating:
To ignore the tax element at the present day would be to
act in a manner which is out of touch with reality.' 9
It is submitted that the rationale of the Dempsey case dcmands
re-evaluation for the following reasons: (1) the complete overthrow of
Billingham v. Hughes by the tax conscious Lord Justices; (2) the untenability
of the American position in view of the penalty imposed;2 0 (3) the uin-
justifiable imposition of the plaintiff's gross damages upon the defendant;2'
(4) the patent inconsistency of the majority which allows the jury to
consider the depreciation of the purchasing value of the dollar,2 2 while
excluding from their consideration the uncertainties of federal income
taxation.
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15. Assume that a plaintiff eanis $10,000 a year, subject to a tax rate of 25%.
Ile would net $7,500. A payment of $7,500, therefore, would fully compensate him
for total disability for one year. If a defendant operating his business at a taxable
profit caused the plaintiff's injury and was required to pay him $10,000, plaintiff would
be additionally compensated $2,500 because of the "tax benefit" rule. The business
entity, however, would suffer no penalty. The $10,000 being a deductible expense
item, the net cost to the defendant (assuming the tax rate to be 25%) would be
$7,500, the amount required to make the plaintiff whole. Under these circumstances
the majority's position is concededly tenable.
If an individual were sued in his personal capacity, i.e., the cause of action was
not incident to his business, our hypothetical plaintiff would again profit to the extent
of $2,500. However, the defendant whose trial expenses would not constitute a
deductible tax item, would be penalized to the extent of $2,500. Under these circum-
stances, tie position of the majority becomes untenable due to the imposition of the
penalty. See INT. Rev. CODE OF 1954 § 162; 2 P.11. Corp. 1956 Fed. Tax Serv.
Vol. 1I, Vj 11,044, 11,046.
16. See notes 3 and 4 supra.
17. [1949] 1 K.B. 643. The cases involved (notes 3 and 4 supra) were either
decided directly on the authority of Billingham, or upon the authority of Hall v.
Chicago & N.\V. Ry., (note 3 supra) which relied directly upon the authority of the
Billingham case.
18. British Transport Comnn'n v. Courley, [1956] 2 W.L.R. 41, For a discussion
of the Gourley case fron an accounting standpoint see 19 Mdoo, L. R'(v. 365 (1956).
19. British 'ransport Comm'n v. Gourley, at 48.
20. See note 15 supra.
21. 72 L.Q. REV. 153 (1956).
22. Anderson v. Nlullaney, 191 F 2d 123 (9th Cir. 1951), Southern Pac. v, Zehnle,
163 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1947); Southern Pac. v. Guthrie, 180 F.2d 295, 303 (9th Cir.
1949) (dictum). Note, Fluctuating Dollars and Tort Damage Verdicts, 48 COL. L. Rv.
261 (1948); Changes in Cost of Living or in Purchasing Power of Money as Affecting
Damages for Personal iniuries or Death, 12 A.L.R.2d 611.
